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 Vatican Mediation and the 
Venezuelan Crisis 
Emma Altheide* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“For there is one God and one mediator between God and mankind—the man 
Christ Jesus.”  The Bible offers this description of Jesus at 1 Timothy 2:5.  While, 
according to Christian beliefs, Jesus left Earth more than 2,000 years ago, mediation 
remains a major function of the Church.  Before leaving Earth, Jesus designated his 
disciple Saint Peter as head of the church, and the papal office was born.  The pa-
pacy has had enormous influence in Western civilization, and took part in interna-
tional disputes throughout the Middle Ages.  This Comment will explore examples 
of Vatican mediation in modern history, and use them to assess the Vatican’s role 
as mediator in Venezuela’s political crisis.  Part II will discuss the dispute between 
Argentina and Chile in the 1970s concerning property rights in the Beagle Channel, 
as well as the restoration of diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba 
in 2015.  Part III will outline the events leading to the crisis in Venezuela, where 
President Nicolás Maduro has brought the government to the brink of authoritarian 
rule.  This section will assess the Vatican’s offer to mediate in Venezuela in light 
of the country’s current climate and previous instances of Vatican mediation.  Part 
IV will examine the Vatican as a mediator, analyzing the attributes that may either 
benefit or hinder its role in the Venezuelan conflict. 
As an editorial note, this Comment is in large part concerned with the political 
crisis in Venezuela, which is ongoing and will continue to develop as this piece is 
published.  Every effort has been made to include the most recent developments, 
but this analysis will not include events occurring after October 2017. 
II.  HISTORY 
A.  The Beagle Channel Dispute 
While is it not unusual for the Vatican to weigh in on political issues,1 formal 
offers to mediate disputes have been infrequent.  The most notable previous exam-
ple of Vatican mediation is the Beagle Channel dispute.  Relatively little scholarship 
has been dedicated to the specific role of the Vatican as mediator in the Beagle 
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1.Philip Pullella, Pope Appears to Back Native Tribes in Dakota Pipeline Conflict, REUTERS (Feb. 15, 
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Channel conflict,2 so this section will use the Beagle Channel mediation to provide 
a historical background, in order to assess how the Vatican might aid in the resolu-
tion of the Venezuelan crisis. 
The Beagle Channel connects the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans at the southern-
most tip of South America.3  Throughout the channel are several islands, the own-
ership of which, until the 1970s, was not of particular concern to the surrounding 
countries of Argentina and Chile.4  The countries had a general understanding 
grounded in the Boundary Treaty of 1881, which gave to Chile “all islands to the 
south of Beagle Channel up to Cape Horn, and those there may be to the west of 
Tierra del Fuego.”5  The countries considered Argentina to have an exclusive pres-
ence in the Atlantic Ocean, and Chile an exclusive presence in the Pacific Ocean—
an agreement known as “biooceanismo.”6  By the 1970s, factors including the is-
lands’ oil and mineral deposits,7 fishing rights, and increased global focus on the 
Antarctic region led both Argentina and Chile to seek a more explicit understanding 
of ownership.8  The countries agreed to arbitration after several unsuccessful at-
tempts at negotiation.9  Under a 1902 treaty between Chile and Argentina, arbitra-
tion over territory and maritime rights was to be conducted by a panel headed by 
the Queen of England.10  In 1977 this panel issued its decision, awarding Argentina 
navigational rights to its naval base in the channel, and Chile the three islands.11  
Increased concern in Argentina about the decision’s effect on its sovereignty led 
Argentina to oppose the decision and mobilize troops to the area.12  As further at-
tempts at negotiation deteriorated, military actions escalated, as did economic sanc-
tions, trade obstacles, and expulsion of immigrants.13 
Mediation by a neutral third party appeared to be the last possible means for 
resolution short of war.  Chilean Foreign Minister Hernan Cubillos described the 
necessary attributes of a mediator for the crisis: “influence, moral power, political 
power, economic power.”14  At the same time, Argentina assessed possible candi-
dates including, “the King of Spain, the United Nations, the Queen of England, UN 
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, Henry Kissinger, and the Pope.”15  Cubillos and 
the Argentinian foreign minister met about the possible mediators, with a result that 
surprised both parties.  After the Argentinian foreign minister made an initial offer 
of the Pope or nothing, Cubillos decided to call his bluff.16  Cubillos recalls the 
realization that Argentina may have poorly predicted Chile’s hand:                                                           
 2. M.C. Mirow, International Law and Religion in Latin America The Beagle Channel Dispute, 28 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
 3. Beagle Channel, Argentina & Chile, WORLD ATLAS, http://www.worldatlas.com/twitter/sa-
trip/beaglechannel/beaglephotopage.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2017). 
 4. Mirow, supra note 2, at 3. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. at 4. 
 7. Juan De Onis, Argentina Accepts Mediation for Southern Islands, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 1978), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1978/11/09/archives/argentina-accepts-mediation-for-southern-islands-vi-
dela-met-chilean.html. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 5. 
 11. Mirow, supra note 2, at 5. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 7. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 9. 
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Now, looking back (because we have analyzed this many times), the Ar-
gentines played that card sure that we would not accept the Vatican as me-
diator.  But I think that they made a great mistake there.  Why did they 
think that we would not accept the Vatican? Because relations between the 
government in Chile and the local church were lousy.  But what they didn’t 
understand ... we had the [local] church on this matter on our side. And 
obviously, we would accept the Vatican if it is number one on my list.  But 
it was incredible, I will never forget that minute, he was so taken back that 
he couldn’t continue the conversation . . . 17 
Nevertheless, after further mobilization of military forces, the newly inaugu-
rated Pope John Paul II sent a personal representative to the area, and military action 
halted.18  The papal representative was Cardinal Antonio Samoré, who had been 
closely associated with Latin America.19  His initial meetings with the countries’ 
representatives consisted of offering the Church’s bons offices, or “good offices,” 
to facilitate communication between the two sides.20  In a process called “shuttle 
diplomacy,”21 Samoré traveled between the two countries, pressing each side to ar-
ticulate their positions on key issues.22  By January 1979, Samoré had a peace agree-
ment signed by the two nations—the Act of Montevideo.23  The Act committed the 
countries to submission of the dispute to the Holy See (the Vatican’s governmental 
body), but contained language vague enough not to contradict stated positions.24 
The agreement to mediate was only the first step.  The mediation itself began 
on March 4, 1979, in a solemn ceremony at the Vatican, with the pope present.25  
The pope called on Samoré again to oversee the mediation.26  For the first few 
months, the mediation consisted of gathering more information on the parties’ po-
sitions.27  After this, the pope made suggestions as to the procedure of reaching an 
agreement.28  A year passed and Samoré suggested that the countries submit pro-
posed solutions, but these were still too far apart.29  As the countries failed to make 
significant movement forward, it was clear that more direct involvement by the 
pope was necessary.30  In December 1980, the pope gave the parties his proposal—
La Propuesta.31 While Chile publicly accepted the Propuesta, Argentina never did.32  
                                                          
 17. Mirow, supra note 2, at 9. 
 18. Id. at 10. 
 19. “Despite being already in his early seventies, Samoré was the ideal person to represent the Pope’s 
intervention. He had a long-standing interest in Latin America and spoke Spanish fluently. He had ac-
companied Paul VI on his trip to Medellin, Colombia, and had been a papal nuncio in Bogota. He had 
been involved with regional conferences of the Latin American episcopate, and even his religious devo-
tion was closely tied to Latin America.” Id. at 11. 
 20. Id. 
 21. THOMAS PRINCEN, INTERMEDIARIES IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT 170-71 (1992). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 148-49. 
 24. Id. at 149 
 25. Id. at 150. 
 26. Mirow, supra note 2, at 12. 
 27. PRINCEN, supra note 21, at 150-51. 
 28. Id. at 151. 
 29. Id. at 153. 
 30. Id. at 154. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 155. 
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For several more years the countries negotiated further over the terms of an agree-
ment, with an assassination attempt on the pope (unrelated to the Beagle Channel 
dispute), the death of Cardinal Samoré, and Malvinas/Falklands war intervening.33  
In June 1984, the cardinal who had replaced Samoré offered the countries a pro-
posed solution from the Holy See, and made it clear that it would be the final assis-
tance effort by the Vatican.34  After a few months of deliberation, the final treaty 
was signed in Reggia Hall, next to the Sistine Chapel.35  The treaty awarded sover-
eignty over the three islands to Chile, but limited the maritime boundary so that 
Argentina could maintain its “biooceanismo” principle.36 
B.  Restoration of U.S.-Cuba Relations 
While not rising to the level of formal mediation, papal intervention played a 
role in one of the most significant foreign policy milestones in recent U.S. history.  
On December 17, 2014, the U.S. announced it would restore diplomatic relations 
with Cuba.37  It was later revealed that in the months leading up to this landmark 
agreement, Pope Francis wrote to Presidents Barack Obama and Raúl Castro, ex-
pressing his desire for the countries to normalize relations.38  Pope Francis has an 
interest in Latin America beyond his role as head of the Catholic Church, as he is 
from Buenos Aires, Argentina.39  According to one report, delegations from the 
U.S. and Cuba met at the Vatican in October 2013 to discuss terms of restoring 
relations.40  Ben Rhodes, former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic 
Communications to President Obama, recounted that over Obama’s March 2014 
trip to the Vatican, Pope Francis discussed U.S.-Cuba relations with him more than 
any other issue.41  One particularly important matter was the imprisonment of Alan 
Gross, a government contractor who was arrested in Cuba in December 2009.42  
Gross was released on December 17, 2014, as part of the movement towards a new 
U.S. foreign policy approach in Cuba.43  Rhodes stated that by October of 2014 the 
countries had effectively reached an agreement on restoring relations, which Obama 
                                                          
 33. PRINCEN, supra note 21, at 155-58. 
 34. Id. at 160. 
 35. Id. at 161, 
 36. Id. 
 37. Peter Baker, U.S. to Restore Full Relations with Cuba, Erasing a Last Trace of Cold War Hostility, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/world/americas/us-cuba-rela-
tions.html. 
 38. Isabela Cocoli, Obama Moved Aggressively to Restore Relations with Cuba, VOA NEWS (Nov. 
26, 2016, 9:18 AM), http://www.voanews.com/a/obama-restored-relations-with-cuba/3612438.html. 
 39. Uki Goni, Pope Francis: The Quiet Man of Buenos Aires Known for his Humble Tastes, THE 
GUARDIAN (Mar. 13, 2013, 8:20 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/14/pope-francis-
quiet-buenos-aires. 
 40. Cocoli, supra note 38. 
 41. 8 Years in the Situation with Ben Rhodes, POD SAVE THE WORLD (Feb. 15, 2017) (downloaded 
using iTunes). 
 42. Glenn Thrush, Cuba’s Prisoner, Alan Gross: Not Impressed with Bernie’s Fidel-ity, POLITICO 
(Mar. 30, 2016, 5:22 AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/03/alan-gross-off-message-cuba-
221367. 
 43. Elise Labott, Cuba Releases American Alan Gross, Paves way for Historic Easing of American 
Sanctions, CNN POLITICS (Dec. 17, 2014, 1:13 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/12/17/politics/cuba-
alan-gross-deal. 
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shared with Pope Francis on another visit to the Vatican.44  Rhodes described the 
role of Pope Francis over months of negotiations as an idiosyncratic one, saying: 
That was the role they [the Vatican] played that was indispensable, be-
cause we can’t trust each other.  How could they [Cuba] trust that we were 
going to do what we said; how could we trust that they were going to do 
what they said?  So, if we deposited those commitments at the Vatican, 
they were essentially a guarantor. Nobody could go back on something 
that they told the Pope.  The Vatican could have come out and said, ‘well 
wait a second, these guys said they were going to do X and they didn’t.’  
And only they could play that role, because they have a degree of respect 
and neutrality—in both countries and around the world.  And so it was 
really emotional; they were overwhelmed.  I remember there was one Vat-
ican official who was in tears, because he had lived and worked in Cuba. 
And it gave me an initial impression as to how big a deal this was going to 
be around the world.45 
Pope Francis has no qualms about weighing in on international and political 
affairs.46  Some were concerned after his election that Francis lacked experience 
with international affairs, and has had limited exposure beyond his native Argen-
tina.47  Francis has proven, however, that he is willing to play a role in critical, and 
often controversial, issues.48  He expressed support of immigration in the wake of 
President Donald Trump’s executive orders restricting immigration to the U.S. from 
certain countries.49  He has embraced the idea of “big politics,” in which diversity 
is embraced and the less fortunate are integrated into society.50  He denounced the 
border wall that was central to Trump’s presidential campaign, saying, “[a] person 
who thinks only about building walls, wherever they may be, and not building 
bridges, is not Christian.  This is not the gospel.”51  Francis expressed support for 
Native Americans opposed to construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline,52 which 
President Trump cleared for completion in the first few weeks of his administra-
tion.53  Throughout Francis’s Argentinian upbringing, “he was shaped by a move-
ment of Catholic continental nationalism that saw social justice and economic sov-
ereignty as key to a better future for Latin America.”54                                                           
 44. POD SAVE THE WORLD, supra note 41. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Camila Domonoske, Pope Francis Meets with Venezuelan President to Discuss Country’s Crisis, 
NPR (Oct. 25, 2016, 11:07 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/10/25/499279732/pope-
francis-meets-with-venezuelan-president-to-discuss-countrys-crisis. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Austin Ivereigh, Is the Pope the Anti-Trump?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/2017/03/04/opinion/sunday/is-the-pope-the-anti-trump.html?smid=tw-ny-
times&smtyp=cur&_r=1. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Daniel Burke, Pope Suggests Trump ‘is not Christian’, CNN POLITICS (Feb. 18, 2016, 10:47 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/18/politics/pope-francis-trump-christian-wall/. 
 52. Pullella, supra note 1. 
 53. Juliet Eilperin & Brady Dennis, Trump Administration to Approve Final Permit for Dakota Access 
Pipeline, THE WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-envi-
ronment/wp/2017/02/07/trump-administration-to-approve-final-permit-for-dakota-access-pipe-
line/?utm_term=.ed88d0d1465f. 
 54. Ivereigh, supra note 49. 
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Given his inclination for political commentary, it is perhaps not surprising that 
Pope Francis made a formal offer to intervene in a crisis threatening the existence 
of a major Latin American nation.55  The rest of this Comment will discuss the 
situation in Venezuela; explore the likelihood of the Vatican fostering a workable 
solution to this crisis; and the possible ramifications for U.S. foreign policy. 
III.  VENEZUELA 
A.  Country in Crisis 
The next stage for Vatican mediation has been set, in the South American re-
public of Venezuela.  A country thoroughly devastated by political corruption,56 
Venezuela sits now at the brink of descent into authoritarian rule.  Economic crisis 
has plagued the country in the wake of the “Bolivarian Revolution” launched by 
late president Hugo Chávez in 2000.57  Redistribution of wealth under Chávez led 
wealthy and middle-class Venezuelans to flee for more hospitable countries—a 
flight some refer to as the “Bolivarian diaspora.”58  The petroleum industry, once 
thriving in the oil-rich nation, has seen plummeting production since Chávez poli-
cies poured oil revenues into social programs.59  This decline in production is 
largely a result of poor management by Petróleos de Venezuela (PDVSA), Vene-
zuela’s state-owned oil company.60  The contracted petroleum industry has led to 
shortages of food and medicine, which have primarily been imported to Vene-
zuela.61  The murder rate is among the highest in the world.62  Inflation has drasti-
cally devalued wages.63 
After the death of Chávez in 2013, Nicolás Maduro was elected as his succes-
sor, winning 50.66% of the popular vote as the candidate of the United Socialist 
Party of Venezuela (PSUV).64  A former bus driver, Maduro became a trade union 
                                                          
 55. Ana Vanessa Herrero & Elisabeth Malkin, Vatican to Act as Mediator Between Venezuela’s Du-
eling Sides, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/25/world/americas/vene-
zuela-nicolas-maduro-pope-francis.html. 
 56. In a 2016 report, Venezuela was ranked number 158 out of 168 of the world’s most corrupt coun-
tries (where the “most corrupt” countries listed were tied for number 167)—the only country in the 




 57. Nicholas Casey, Hungry Venezuelans Flee in Boats to Escape Economic Collapse, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/25/world/americas/hungry-venezuelans-flee-in-
boats-to-escape-economic-collapse.html?_r=0. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Nicholas Casey & Clifford Krauss, How Bad Off Is Oil-Rich Venezuela? It’s Buying U.S. Oil, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/21/world/americas/venezuela-oil-
economy.html. 
 60. Steve Hanke, Venezuela’s PDVSA: The World’s Worst Oil Company, FORBES (Mar. 6, 2017, 
10:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevehanke/2017/03/06/venezuelas-pdvsa-the-worlds-worst-
oil-company/#44b4a0e44105. 
 61. Casey & Krauss, supra note 59. 
 62. The World’s Most Corrupt Countries, supra note 56. 
 63. Casey & Krauss, supra note 59. 
 64. Virginia Lopez & Jonathan Watts, Nicolás Maduro Declared Venezuela Election Winner by Thin 
Margin, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2013, 1:09 AM), https://www.theguard-
ian.com/world/2013/apr/15/nicolas-maduro-wins-venezuela-election. 
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leader, and was elected to the General Assembly in 2000.65  Among other things, 
Maduro’s lack of “academic qualifications, charisma, or crucial connection to Ven-
ezuela’s armed forces” was seen as a cause of PSUV’s overwhelming defeat in 
Venezuela’s 2015 parliamentary elections.66  The opposition party won a majority 
of seats in the National Assembly, in the worst-ever defeat for Chávez’s socialists.67  
Following the election, the opposition focused its efforts on meeting the constitu-
tional requirements for a recall referendum to end Maduro’s term early.68  The Ma-
duro administration erected barriers to a referendum at every opportunity.  Opposi-
tion leaders were jailed and members of the media prevented from entering the 
country.69 
In September 2016, a march called “the taking of Caracas” drew thousands to 
the Venezuelan capital in support of the opposition’s referendum.70  Protestors fac-
ing rising prices and longer lines for food took to Caracas to express their despera-
tion, and discontent with Maduro.71  Despite promises from the opposition that the 
referendum would move forward, nothing came to pass, and Maduro remained in 
power.72  As the two sides became more entrenched, it became increasingly difficult 
for Venezuelans to access food, medicine, and other basic necessities.73  Maduro 
and the opposition seemed to be at an impasse, with no recourse but military ac-
tion—not unlike the situation that faced the foreign ministers of Argentina and 
Chile in 1978.74  In late March 2017, the Venezuelan Supreme Court handed down 
a decision that would allow it to assume the functions of the opposition-led Con-
gress, sparking major protests.75  The court swiftly overturned “the most controver-
sial parts of this decision,” but it nonetheless led to condemnation from Venezuelan 
and international parties.76  In July 2017, a vote was held on a new governing body 
called the National Constituent Assembly, which would have the authority to re-
write the country’s constitution.77  President Maduro decreed the existence of the 
Assembly, and the vote to elect its members was held July 30, 2017.78  Following 
the vote, Maduro declared victory and clashes between police and members of the 
                                                          
 65. Virginia Lopez & Jonathan Watts, Who is Nicolás Maduro? Profile of Venezuela’s New President, 
THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2013, 3:35 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/apr/15/nicolas-
maduro-profile-venezuela-president. 
 66. Wyre Davies, Venezuela Elections: Why did Maduro’s Socialists Lose?, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35025941. 
 67. Wyre Davies, Venezuela Elections: Maduro’s Socialists Trounced, BBC NEWS (Dec. 7, 2015), 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-35019111. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Nicholas Casey & Patricia Torres, Thousands March in Venezuela to Demand President’s Ouster, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/02/world/americas/caracas-venezuela-
nicolas-maduro-protests.html?action=click&contentCollection=Americas&module=RelatedCover-
age&region=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Mirow, supra note 2, at 10. 
 75. Eyanir Chinea & Alexandra Ulmer, Venezuelans Mount Another Wave of Anti-Government Pro-
tests, REUTERS (Apr. 10, 2017, 11:41 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-politics-
idUSKBN17C1Y4. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Zeeshan Aleem, Venezuela Just Moved One Step Closer to Authoritarianism, VOX (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/31/16058998/venezuela-election-maduro-constitution. 
 78. Id. 
7
Altheide: Vatican Mediation and the Venezuelan Crisis
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
256 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2018 
opposition—who claimed the election was a fraud—became violent.79  After sev-
eral delays by Maduro, gubernatorial elections for Venezuela’s 23 states were held 
on October 15, 2017, and Maduro’s socialist party won 17 governorships.80  The 
Democratic Unity coalition, a collection of opposition parties, had claimed the gu-
bernatorial ballots would be confusing for voters since every parties’ candidate 
would be listed despite primaries that narrowed the field to a single candidate per 
state.81 
B.  Vatican’s Offer to Mediate 
In October 2016, as tensions between the Maduro administration and the op-
position escalated, representatives of both sides flew to the Vatican and agreed to 
allow for mediation of a dialogue between the parties.82  Just one day previously, 
the Venezuelan Congress had accused Maduro of staging a coup in order to stall the 
referendum.83  Protestors in red shirts interrupted the meeting of Congress, where 
legislators had been delivering speeches in a state of “open rebellion.”84  The Vati-
can had begun attempts to intercede in May 2016,85 but it was not until October that 
this first meeting occurred.86  While Jesús Torrealba, the secretary general of the 
coalition of opposition parties, attended the meeting and agreed to mediation, jailed 
opposition leader Leopoldo López expressed his objection, saying, “the people’s 
right to express themselves was robbed.”87  The first formal meeting was scheduled 
to take place in October 2016, on Margarita Island, with the pope’s envoy, Arch-
bishop Emil Paul Tscherrig, presiding.88  After initial meetings, the opposition ex-
pressed frustration with Maduro’s failure to follow through on promises to release 
jailed opposition leaders.89  Critics went as far as to argue that Pope Francis wrongly 
legitimized Maduro by intervening, and urged Francis to back out of the conflict.90  
At this point, the future role of the Vatican in the conflict is uncertain.  What is 
certain is that the resolution of this dispute between Venezuela’s major parties will 
                                                          
 79. Aleem, supra note 77. 
 80. Scott Neuman, Venezuela’s Ruling Party Wins Surprise Victory In Regional Elections, NPR (Oct. 
16, 2017), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/10/16/557977291/venezuelas-ruling-party-
wins-surprise-victory-in-regional-elections. 
 81. Venezuela opposition says ballot sheet unfair for Oct. 15 vote, REUTERS (Oct. 6, 2017), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-election/venezuela-opposition-says-ballot-sheet-unfair-
for-oct-15-vote-idUSKBN1CB2FG. 
 82. Herrero & Malkin, supra note 55. 
 83. The Associated Press, Venezuelan Congress Accuses Maduro Government of Staging Coup, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/24/world/americas/venezuela-congress-nico-
las-maduro.html?action=click&contentCollection=Americas&module=RelatedCoverage&re-
gion=EndOfArticle&pgtype=article. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Herrero & Malkin, supra note 55. 
 86. Domonoske, supra note 46. 
 87. Herrero & Malkin, supra note 55. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Reuters in Caracas, Venezuela’s Opposition says Vatican-Brokered Talks are ‘Frozen’, THE 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 23, 2016, 3:17 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/23/venezuela-ni-
colas-maduro-opposition-vatican-talks-frozen. 
 90. Orlando Avendaño, Vatican Role in Venezuela’s Crisis Sparks Backlash, Columnist Asks Pope 
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be critical to U.S. foreign policy, oil prices, the world economy, and the Venezuelan 
people deprived of basic human rights.91  Initial frustrations may not yet spell failure 
for the Vatican.  The mediation in the Beagle Channel dispute was only resolved 
after years of deliberation, uncertainty, and tension between the parties, with vary-
ing levels of Vatican involvement. 
C.  Comparison to Previous Vatican Mediations 
In order to better understand the likelihood of the Vatican assisting in a suc-
cessful negotiation with the Venezuelans, it is helpful to draw comparisons between 
the present crisis and the Vatican interventions described earlier.  First, like Argen-
tina, Chile, and Cuba, Venezuela is a Latin American country.  Latin America is 
home to more than 425 million Catholics—roughly 69 percent of the region’s pop-
ulation,92 and almost 40 percent of the world’s Catholic population.93  Pope Francis 
is the first pope from Latin America, and he has demonstrated his concern for Latin 
American issues in meetings with world leaders.94  While the region is undeniably 
tied to Catholicism, there is evidence that Latin America’s identification with Ca-
tholicism has declined in recent years.95  This gap is prominent in Venezuela, where 
Chávez sparred with bishops before his death.96  Venezuelan church leaders even 
refused an order of Pope John Paul II to desist from supporting a coup d’état attempt 
against Chávez in 2002.97 
Like in the Beagle Channel dispute, tensions between the opposing parties in 
Venezuela have reached a boiling point.  In the 1970s, Argentina and Chile had 
reached a point so antagonistic that the suggestion of papal mediation was nothing 
more than rhetoric designed to be rejected.98  The climate of Venezuela is similarly 
fraught—its citizens are in desperate need of food and medicine, and the govern-
ment is in a state of constitutional crisis.  Might the Vatican have the same effect 
between Venezuela’s dueling parties as it did between the Argentines and Chileans? 
The most salient difference between the Venezuelan conflict and the Beagle 
Channel dispute is that the conflict in Venezuela is between domestic parties.  While 
the crisis has ramifications internationally, the parties that must ultimately come to 
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an agreement are both Venezuelan.  In contrast, many of the reasons that Argen-
tina99 and Chile100 chose the Vatican to mediate were grounded in the countries’ 
fear of unfair treatment due to their poor standing in the international community. 
D.  Ramifications for U.S. Relations with Venezuela 
The resolution of the political crisis in Venezuela will inevitably be felt in the 
United States.  The U.S.-Venezuela relationship has been tense in recent years.101  
Presidents Chávez and Maduro both expressed opposition to the United States, crit-
icizing U.S. government, policy, and relations with Latin America.102  Two of the 
biggest influences on the nations’ bilateral relationship are the oil industry and hu-
man rights issues.103  Although the United States has previously been a major mar-
ket for Venezuelan oil, the decline of PDVSA actually forced Venezuela to import 
U.S. oil in 2016.104  In 2011, the U.S. imposed sanctions on PDVSA under the Iran 
Sanctions Act of 1996, after Venezuela’s state-owned oil company delivered a 
blending component for gasoline to Iran.105  The U.S. also imposed sanctions in 
2013 under the Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Act, and in 2015, 
President Obama signed an Executive Order titled “Blocking Property and Sus-
pending Entry of Certain Persons Contributing to the Situation in Venezuela.”106  
Venezuela and the U.S. are members of many of the same international organiza-
tions, although in 2013, Venezuela formally withdrew from the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights.107  Deterioration of the situation in Venezuela would mean 
a less stable Latin America, and, in an extreme scenario, possibly mass migration 
to the United States.108 
IV.  THE VATICAN AS MEDIATOR 
The Vatican is a unique player on the world stage—it wields influence and 
power disproportionate to its physical domain of just half a square kilometer in 
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Rome.109  Its figurative doors are “open to all,” but its physical doors admit only a 
select, powerful few.110  This section will explore characteristics of the Vatican that 
shape its effectiveness as a mediator, and assess how these might impact its capacity 
in the Venezuelan crisis. 
A.  Bureaucracy 
The Holy See is the Vatican’s government, organized as a monarchy with the 
pope at the top.111  The Roman Curia is the administrative body, and acts as papal 
secretariat.112  The Curia consists of the Secretary of State, the Council for the Pub-
lic Affairs of the Church, ‘congregations,’ the Sacred College of Cardinals, and 
various tribunals and institutes.113  In the past, the Vatican bureaucracy has certainly 
been equipped to handle complicated and even volatile disputes.114 
Reports of financial mismanagement, however, have garnered significant at-
tention in the press and several books.115  Pope Francis established a commission to 
study financial operations of the Holy See following leaks that precipitated the pub-
lication of “Sua Santità,” or “His Holiness,” by Gianluigi Nuzzi in 2012.116  In 2015, 
two members of this commission were arrested on suspicion of leaking confidential 
documents.117  While many of the claims about financial mismanagement are im-
possible to verify,118 the leaking suggests a certain level of turmoil within the Holy 
See’s hierarchy. 
Despite bureaucratic issues that may work to hinder effective mediation, the 
Vatican administration maintains strong ties to Latin America.  The Holy See’s 
Secretary of State, Pietro Parolin, recently served as papal envoy to Caracas.119  The 
Jesuits, a Catholic fraternity to which Pope Francis belongs, recently elected a Ven-
ezuelan to its highest office.120  The Vatican’s strong ties to Latin America, and 
Venezuela in particular, may counteract shortcomings in administrative profi-
ciency. 
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B.  Moral Authority 
Parties in dispute often seek out mediators with specific types of authority.  In 
the absence of an authoritative third party, it can be difficult for entrenched parties 
to move forward.  But what is the authority of the Vatican?  It cannot impose sanc-
tions on states, or provide economic rewards.121  It has no military force, and is the 
smallest state in the world by both area and population.122  Its authority is a moral 
one.123  The Vatican is one of the oldest religious institutions in the world, and the 
seat of a church that claims more than 1.2 billion members.124  It is founded on the 
teachings of Jesus Christ, who lived more than 2,000 years ago and established the 
papal office by designating St. Peter to lead the church.125  Catholics believe in the 
doctrine of infallibility, by which certain decisions concerning faith or morals—
made by ecumenical councils and approved by the Pope—are considered to be 
guided by the Holy Spirit, and therefore infallible.126  The doctrine of papal infalli-
bility holds that ex cathedra teachings of the pope are also infallible.127  The Vati-
can’s authority, therefore, comes from a belief in its moral superiority. 
Of course, this is the moral authority of an institution marked by a pervasive 
pedophilia scandal, the depth of which continues to be understood.  Pope Francis 
promised to restructure the Church’s approach toward sexual abuse—including cre-
ating a tribunal to try accused bishops128—but some critics see recent actions as 
undercutting this pledge.129  In June 2017, Francis granted a leave of absence to 
Cardinal George Pell, one of his top advisors, after Pell was charged with sexual 
offenses in Australia.130  The tribunal that Francis had initially approved was shut-
tered after reported resistance within the Vatican.131 
In Venezuela, this moral authority is further complicated by complaints among 
devout Catholics that the Vatican has not adequately addressed human rights viola-
tions by the government.132  Catholics have complained that the government is 
blocking the efforts of Catholic charities to aid in the humanitarian crisis, straining 
the church-state relationship.133  There was also unrest among Venezuelan Catholics 
after Pope Francis met with President Maduro in October 2016, and did not take the 
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opportunity to rebuke him openly for the country’s humanitarian crisis.134  Human 
Rights Watch, a secular non-governmental organization based in New York, even 
wrote an open letter to Pope Francis, urging him to directly address the “authoritar-
ian practices” of the Venezuelan government.135  This disquiet spells trouble for the 
Vatican’s moral authority as a mediator.  If Catholics do not believe Pope Francis 
will effectively advocate on behalf of human rights issues, why would they support 
further Vatican involvement, or acquiesce to an agreement made under Vatican su-
pervision?  This legitimacy only exists when others believe that what the pope wants 
is rightfully his to request.136 
C.  Neutrality 
This moral authority typically lends itself to another characteristic of effective 
mediators—neutrality.  The neutrality of the Vatican has historically come from 
both its sense of moral integrity as well as an absence of traditional state interests.  
It does not have traditional military or political ambitions, and therefore enjoys a 
high level of ‘disinterestedness and objectivity’ in disputes between other coun-
tries.137  What matters most to the Church is preservation of peace—this is central 
to its religious mission.138  Because peace is the primary interest, it should theoret-
ically be easy for countries to trust the neutrality of the Vatican as a mediator. 
Peace is undoubtedly a primary objective in the Venezuelan crisis, in addition 
to reaching an agreement on government control.  Pope Francis has a strong interest 
in maintaining peace in Latin America, given that he is from Argentina, and a sig-
nificant portion of the World’s Catholics live in Latin America.  Additionally, Ven-
ezuela’s role in the oil industry makes its stability critical to the world economy.  
As has been discussed, however, this perception of neutrality is in jeopardy.139  If 
peace is still the primary interest of the Vatican, why has this not led to the same 
perception of neutrality of the pope?  Pope Francis’ failure to rebuke Maduro pub-
licly may be a tactical move—upsetting Maduro could simply lead him to walk 
away from the mediation effort. However, if the failure to rebuke the government 
causes the opposition to walk away, the result is just as problematic. 
D.  Status 
The concept of status ties into the moral authority of the Vatican, but it is worth 
considering this characteristic in its own right.  It refers simply to the prominence 
and significance of the Vatican, and the pope himself.  This status is especially po-
tent in person, within Vatican City’s walls.  As Professor Thomas Princen writes, 
“The aura of the physical surroundings, the magnificent ceremonies, the pomp and 
circumstance, are unmatched anywhere in the world.  In this age of democracy and 
egalitarianism, the Vatican is one of the few places where kneeling is still the 
norm.”140  This prestige is a valuable asset, and it drives the way people and entities 
                                                          
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Mediation by a Transnational Organization: The Case of the Vatican, supra note 109, at 159. 
 137. PRINCEN, supra note 21, at 141. 
 138. Mirow, supra note 2 at 27. 
 139. Erasmus & S.G., supra note 119. 
 140. Mediation by a Transnational Organization: The Case of the Vatican, supra note 109, at 162. 
13
Altheide: Vatican Mediation and the Venezuelan Crisis
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
262 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2018 
interact with the Vatican.  Aside from the authority that allows a mediator to move 
disputing parties forward, there is this regard that parties have for the mediator, 
which is sometimes the only thing keeping them at the table. 
For example, the Vatican’s authority in the Beagle Channel dispute allowed for 
careful exploration of possible solutions, but it also gave the countries a healthy 
sense of shame at the prospect of failing to agree.  Walking away from a negotiation 
table where the pope sat was disgraceful enough that Argentina and Chile were 
forced to work out the dispute.  Professor Princen writes, “to send the envoy home 
without agreement and then launch an invasion would have been nearly unthinkable 
. . . whereas an invasion would have rallied public support without papal interven-
tion, it became unthinkable in the presence of a papal envoy.”141  Former Deputy 
National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes also mentioned this as playing a role in the 
U.S.-Cuba talks.  Because neither party felt they could trust the other, the Vatican 
acted as guarantor—”nobody could go back on something that they told the 
Pope.”142 
The status of a mediator can achieve the simple goal of keeping the parties at 
the table.  While negotiations may still be protracted and bitter, parties are less likely 
to walk away from intermediaries who carry as much respect and historical signifi-
cance as the Vatican.143  Of course, for the status of the Vatican to have this desired 
effect, the disputing parties must buy in; they must believe that this respect is owed. 
In Venezuela, it appears that this valuable asset is at risk, and may even back-
fire.  Much of the concern about Pope Francis’ meetings with Maduro stems from 
a perception that merely by meeting with him, the pope legitimizes Maduro’s ad-
ministration and its tainted human rights record.  Whereas in the Beagle Channel 
dispute, the presence of a papal envoy was “a legitimating factor for the leader-
ship,”144 and therefore facilitated discussions, in the case of Venezuela it may do 
more harm than good. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Vatican mediation has come at a critical point in the Venezuelan crisis.  Just as 
in the Beagle Channel dispute, military action seems to be the only alternative to 
negotiated agreement between the disputing parties.  The Vatican maintains the 
same characteristics that allowed it to facilitate agreements between Argentina and 
Chile, and the United States and Cuba, but these may not have the same effect in 
Venezuela.  The Church’s handling of several scandals, and perceptions about Pope 
Francis’s relationship with Venezuelan leaders, threatens the perception of author-
ity, neutrality, and status that are all vital to effective Vatican mediation.  While the 
prestige of the Vatican has previously been able to keep even some of the most 
contentious parties at the table, that may not be the case in Venezuela.  The Vatican 
must maintain a careful balance in communication, and be wary of the legitimacy 
it lends to certain figures, in order to remain the neutral third party that can bring 
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about a peaceful resolution, and hopefully bring an end to Venezuela’s political, 
economic, and humanitarian woes. 
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